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ABSTRACT:
Decisions regarding capacity and capital investment are among the most critical for firms, as
reflected in the extensive literature devoted to this subject. However, substantially less work
has been carried out on the decision to disinvest. This is unfortunate as in some situations,
such as recessionary times, the main competitive moves pertain to disinvestment, rather than
investment. This study aims to contribute to this subject, in particular it aims to identify why
industries with a concentrated structure can when proactively rationalise when required,
while fragmented ones cannot.
Research methodology a case study approach, comprising in-depth interviews with six
industry experts from the Irish printing industry. This aimed to explore the reasons for the
excess capacity in this industry, the impediments to rationalising, and to explore whether any
potential solutions to the capacity issues in the industry could be identified. The findings
support the theoretical models of a maturing and fragmented industry with rising capacity
(Porter, 1980, Bower, 1986, and Woods, 2009). Causes of excess capacity identified in prior
studies such as new substitutes, improvements in technology, recession and the pursuit of
more (Collins, 2009). This last cause can lead to over-investment, and create barriers to exit.
A number of themes emerged in relation to internal and external failings, in a time of industry
change. Proactive approaches to rationalising were identified from the literature and
examined with a view to their potential in this contextual situation. These were then explored
with the respondents, possible solutions and recommendations for this struggling industry
were then developed.

INTRODUCTION:
When excess capacity fails to proactively exit from an industry, the profitability of the entire
industry can suffer as a result. Preventing this are exit barriers, which in relation to this
research are mainly economic and managerial. However, industries do not always fail to
proactively rationalise, examples of some more positive experiences can be seen in research
by Bower (1986) and Wood (2009). In their research the rationalisation was driven by market
leaders, the presence of such leaders is a reflection of the concentrated industry structure of
the industries they examined. In contrast to their research, this study focuses on the
fragmented Irish Printing industry, which by definition is a leaderless, confrontational,
uncooperative and intensely competitive industry. With such a structure the product is
typically a commodity and combined with the presence of excess capacity, competition tends
to be based solely on price.
There is a gap in the literature relating to fragmented industries and capacity rationalisation
that will be addressed in this research. This opportunity is extremely rare as research in the
area of rationalisation typically clusters around economic decline, because it is here that the
need for rationalisation intensifies, bringing with it better access to primary data. In this
research, the mature fragmented Irish printing industry will be examined, where the need for
rationalisation is clearly evident. The overall goal of this research is to understand why
proactive rationalisation will not occur in this industry contrary to arguments in previous
research on concentrated industries. The proactive rationalisation referred to is acquisition

which is used interchangeably with the word merger, and also takeover, referring to an
aggressive acquisition.
It is hoped that this research can be a catalyst through which practitioners and academics can
understand and better deal with such an important divestment issue as capacity
rationalisation.

CAPACITY RATIONALISATION AND EXIT BARRIERS:
Capacity investment and divestment decisions are among the most important a firm makes,
however substantially less work has been carried out on the decision to disinvest (Wood,
2009). This is unfortunate as in some situations the important competitive moves pertain to
disinvestment rather than investment, where capacity must be reduced for a company or
industry to remain profitable (Ghemawat and Nalebuff, 1990). Capacity can be defined as the
maximum level of value added activity that an operation, process, or facility is capable of
over a period of time. Get the balance between capacity and demand right and the operation
can satisfy its customers effectively. Get it wrong and it will fail to satisfy demand and the
firm (and industry) will have excessive costs (Slack and Chambers, 2007).

Excess Capacity:
A situation of excess capacity is where actual production is less than what is achievable or
optimal for a firm. It is not to be mistaken for 'slack' that can be defined as the excess
capacity maintained by an organisation. This could be optimal for the firm as there needs to
be some room for manoeuvre from an operations perspective. Excess capacity in this study is
specifically looking at the non-optimal surplus presence of capacity. It implies wasteful use
of funds and can result from a mismatch between demand and supply. One impact of excess
capacity is on price. When supply exceeds demand price has a tendency to fall. In this
situation, a firm will operate a productive facility at a lower rate than that at which average
cost achieves its minimum (Kamien and Schwartz, 1972). Depending on the level of excess
capacity, “the profitability of the entire industry can be persistently low as a result” (Porter,
1980, p21).
Some common causes of excess capacity will now be discussed. The main reasons for excess
capacity developing in an industry are as follows:
- Substitutes: A new product or service supplants another.
- Technology: Improvements in machinery and technology can add to productivity and
therefore grow capacity.
- Recession: A recession is believed to be caused by a widespread drop in spending. They are
defined as two or more consecutive quarters of negative GDP growth (Knoop, 2010). The
relationship between recession/ downturns and excess capacity and rationalisation issues can
be very clearly seen in the high number of academic and practitioner studies clustered around
economic downturns.
- The undisciplined pursuit of more: This concept is introduced in research carried out by
Collins (2009). His study anticipated that most companies fall from greatness because they
become complacent, fail to stimulate innovation, initiate bold action, fail to ignite change or
just become lazy and watch the world pass them by. However, what he discovered was that

there was little evidence of any of these found when the companies researched fell.
Overreaching much better explained how the once invincible can self-destruct. From an
excess capacity perspective, the undisciplined pursuit of more is very relevant when this
involves over-investment in capacity.
- Overbuilding of the industry: This involves building too much capacity into the industry. It
can occur in a number of situations: when high exit barriers prevents the excess leaving the
market smoothly, when suppliers promote overbuilding with easy finance, subsidies etc.,
large numbers of firms are all jockeying for position, lack of market leadership enforcing
reason, and finally production oriented management, where the focus is more on 'having the
shiniest new plant' is viewed as a gateway to increased market share (Porter, 1980).

Capacity Rationalisation:
Capacity rationalisation is performed with the objective of positively impacting on a
company, process or industry. It aims to make the company more efficient by dispensing with
superfluous personnel or equipment (Oxford, 2010). Bower (1986) argues that when a
situation of excess capacity exists, prices should fall and manufacturers then shed capacity in
order to reduce losses. That would indeed be a rational line of thought, and reflect
neoclassical (rational) economic models of firm exit. These assume capacity closure
decisions are implemented by reference to a simple threshold trigger. Their framework is
premised on the assumption that capacity is closed as soon as it ceases to be profitable
(Wood, 2009).
Keeping with the notion that capacity must be reduced to remain profitable and in line with
neoclassical economics, in theory the least efficient producers exit first, thus guaranteeing the
market lowest cost supply. However, in practice this does not happen, due to the reluctance of
individual firms to voluntarily implement the market solution of cutting productive capacity
as plants become uneconomic, this implies that the industry will experience prolonged pain
before embarking on the necessary path of radical rationalisation (Harrigan, 1982, Wood,
2009, Jensen, 1993, Porter, 1980, Bower, 1986).
Proactive capacity rationalisation: Capacity in an industry may rationalise through a number
of methods:
- Firms can choose to exit
- Firms can be incentivised to exit, this would generally be through political intervention
- Through merger or acquisition
- Firms collectively cut capacity, by setting up a strategic alliance with this aim
- Diversification within the industry, though this strategy would need to be pursued
proactively and is generally considered at too late a stage.
- Do nothing and hope that others will exit, taking the greatest and least rational risk of all
(Drucker, 1994), this is only rational if the firm has deep pockets.

Structural Analysis:
The concept of industry structure is central to the area of capacity rationalisation as structure
determines profitability (Porter, 1980) and also how rapidly competitors will retire excess
supply (Porter, 1985). Likewise, Whinston (1988) emphasises that it is hard to predict how
capacity will rationalise with specific reference to understanding industry structure. Three
aspects of industries will be considered here in turn, under the industry structure umbrella:

•
•
•

Number of firms:
Competitive rivalry.
Exit barriers.

Number of Firms:
A basic contention of industrial organisation theory is that firm numbers and the distribution
of market shares among firms are important determinants of industry prices and profit. This
proposition is supported by numerous empirical studies showing a positive relationship
between concentration and prices, concentration and profitability, and between concentration
and price-cost margins (Lamm, 1981). In line with this Bower (1986) argued that
concentration (a reduction in the number of competitors) is a key pre-requisite to solving the
problems of an industry facing excess capacity. Wood (2009) generalises Bowers argument
by stating that concentration through acquisition is a necessary pre-requisite for fundamental
restructuring to the case of a relatively small competitive industry. This suggests that without
rationalisation through acquisition, an industry cannot restructure.
At its most basic level, the structure of an industry refers primarily to the number of sellers,
or number of firms in that industry. At one extreme of market structure is a monopoly and at
the other is the perfectly competitive market which has a very large number of small firms
(Grimm et al., 2006).
To better highlight the polar opposites in terms of firm size, an example of a concentrated
industry structure in the form of a cartel would be Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting
Countries (OPEC). According to Scherer (1996), between 1982 and 87 Nigeria was under
extreme pressure from the World Bank to sort out its economy, mainly its large deficit. At the
time Nigeria’s output was 1.37 million barrels of oil per day. If it wanted, Nigeria could have
output an additional 600k barrels a day and added $5 Billion to its exports. They did not,
instead they kept with their quota (set by OPEC), and when asked why they did not take
advantage and help themselves a Nigerian economist explained; “if we heavily discount our
oil sales, the other OPEC nations cannot help but match our discounts, and then we will all
end up selling our oil for less” (Scherer, 1996, pg90). This attitude epitomises the thinking of
a loyal cartel member, and highlights how in consolidated industries, rivals may be
advantageous (Wright et al., 2004), which in the above example is a defence of profit level
through controlling output. The opposite is true, or at least more difficult in the other end of
firm concentration i.e. a fragmented industry, where in contrast to the previous example the
large number of competitors generally means that buyers have greater power to play one
competitor against the other (Porter, 1980).
Competitive Rivalry:
An understanding of competitive rivalry is important because in terms of rationalisation it has
a direct impact on industry profitability, which in turn impacts on exit barriers and
rationalisation, hence the reason why it is discussed in this research. Competitive rivalry
tends
to
be
high
under
the
following
conditions,
according
to
Porter (1980):
1. There is little differentiation between the products sold between customers
2. Competitors are approximately the same size as each other
3. If the competitors all have similar strategies

4. It is costly to leave the industry hence they fight to just stay in (exit barriers)
5. Low market growth rates (growth of a particular company is possible only at the
expense of a competitor)
6. High “strategic stakes” are tied up in capital equipment, research or marketing
7. High fixed or storage costs, which encourages fast turnover of inventory
8. When capacity can only be increased by large amounts. In this case companies will
fight to protect their market share, or compete aggressively to increase it substantially

Competitive rivalry mainly relates to impact on competition and profit, but one of the above
elements is just as important as competitive rivalry itself: Exit barriers are probably the most
important area of structure to understand in terms of failure for capacity to rationalise. As
already stated in the beginning of this section competitive rivalry heightens these through
erosion of profitability.

Exit barriers:
Porter’s (1976) well titled ‘please note the location of the nearest exit’ is a seminal academic
study of exit barriers. Interest in this area also peaks around downturns. Indeed, the first line
in his work on exit barriers begins ‘With the recent downturn’ (Porter, 1976, pg21). His
central point is that there are a series of barriers to exit working against divestment decisions,
in such a way that companies are inclined to hang on to unprofitable businesses. Indeed the
rate of convergence to equilibrium is faster when there are fewer barriers to entry and exit
(Inaba, 1978). Exit barriers arise from the industry environment, strategy and decision
making process of a company and can be classified as follows:
1) Structural (or economic) exit barriers
2) Corporate strategy exit barriers
3) Managerial exit barriers
While (1) and (2) are characteristics of firms which make it in the company’s best interest to
stay even though they are earning a rate that is below the cost of capital, (3) deters
management from making decisions to exit even though they are justified on economic
grounds (Herck, 1984).

1) Structural (or economic) exit barriers:
In a downturn economic (structural) barriers are the principle problem. They deter firms’
timely exit and would represent factors that influence a firm to operate its assets even if it
earns a subnormal rate of return on them (Harrigan, 1980a, Harrigan, 1981, Porter, 1976).
These can be the costs associated with eliminating a plant or the lack of a resale market for
the plant and its assets (Harrigan, 1980a). This lack of resale market is quite likely to
deteriorate badly just when a company wants to sell them (Porter, 1976). Exits should be
executed before the asset resale market sours, as although it may seem desirable for the firm
to wait for the situation to become less uncertain, waiting could be detrimental (Harrigan,

1980b). It is in the industrys' interest to reign in any increases in capacity promptly as soon as
any fall in demand is predicted.
An important distinction to make at this juncture is between companies that have sunk capital
costs and those who do not. Those without them have better exit options than those who
would have high capital investments (Rosenbaum and Lamort, 1992). Therefore services
companies for example, with no machinery, have more options than manufacturing
companies. Capacity rationalisation is more of an issue in industries with high sunk costs
because they act as barriers to exit. This research will focus on those that would have high
sunk capital such as manufacturing firms.

2) Corporate strategy exit barriers:
Just like structural barriers to exit, certain kinds of overall corporate strategy choices can
place companies in situations where it pays for them to stay in business even when the
business is earning a chronically unsatisfactory rate of return on investment (Porter, 1976).

3) Managerial exit barriers:
These arise from the management characteristics and decision making processes. Decisions
are made that are not in the best interests of the company. An example of a managerial barrier
would be where a manager was unable to let go of a businesses because of personal
identification and emotional attachment to it, especially if they were involved in the original
investment decision (Sewing, 2010). They develop pride and commitment in their businesses.
Commitment and intense involvement with the business are important characteristics of a
successful leader and effective manager. It is ironic that managers and leaders like this who
are proud and committed avoid the rational and economically justified exit decision that is
easier for a less emotionally attached one (Porter, 1976).

Fragmented Industry Structure:
Just to be clear, there is no specific definition of a fragmented industry, although according to
Porter (1980) the essential notion that makes these industries a unique environment to
compete in is the absence of market leaders. One such fragmented industry acknowledged by
Porter was that of the commercial lithographic printing industry.
The main reason for the absence of leaders is that in such an industry a company trying to
gain a dominant share is usually doomed to failure (Porter, 1980). The reason why it is
doomed is because of the competitive confrontational nature of such an industry. A very
informative academic article by Wright et al (2004) identified this confrontational manner of
the fragmented industry across multiple disciplines such as Game Theory, Institutional
Theory and Population Ecology, from which the following four key points have been
extrapolated;
1)
In fragmented industries rivals may ordinarily be a threat, whereas in consolidated
industries they may be beneficial. That is because in fragmented industries competitors tend
to be confrontational but in many consolidated industries enterprises can be non-

confrontational and mutually advantageous in their rivalry. This is in line with the OPEC
example given earlier.
2)
They contend that toe-to-toe competition, characteristic of a fragmented industry, not
only may be harmful for each enterprise but also such rivalry may undermine the health of
the industry.
3)
Citing Cournot (1971) they highlight that in Cournot's model, numerous firms in the
industry, characteristic of fragmented industries, are related to a more intense competition
and reduced profitability. That is because as the number of rivals increases in an industry, the
equilibrium price declines until it approaches the product's marginal cost.
4)
In fragmented industries, announcements of bankruptcy will be associated with
positive abnormal returns for non-bankrupt competitors because the existence of rivals is
disadvantageous. To the extent that distress in one company could be received positively in
others because of the above.
All of the above are in line with Porter’s (1980) thinking. But there is an element of bitterness
and resentment in the above points that is not as evident in his work, in particular in point (4)
where distress in one is welcomed in the other. The above points from Wright et al (2004) are
central in terms of fragmented industries and highlights their confrontational manner and its
impact on profitability, only serves to raise economic barriers and prevent proactive as
opposed to market driven rationalisation.
The Irish Printing Industry:
An overview of the Irish Printing industry is now presented using both industry journals and
reports, with emphasis on the critical issues of: training, overcapacity and the commodity
nature of product. The majority of companies within this sector are companies that can
produce among others: business cards, annual reports, programmes, flyers or letterheads. A
medium to large sized company produces any of the aforementioned, with jobs worth
anywhere between €50 and €300,000. The companies are manufacturing based, with a high
level of fixed capital which is industry specific and as such is harder to sell in a less profitable
environment.
As per the last industry report (McKeown et al., 2005) the Irish printing industry was made
up of around 371 companies, with circa 70% of companies having less than 20 employees.
This is one of the reasons why the industry is deemed to be fragmented, the majority of
players are small regional companies (McKeown et al., 2005), in addition, there are no
market leaders in the industry. In fragmented industries there tends to be a high presence of
owner manager companies. This industry is no exception, there are a high number of family
run businesses.
Training - With the presence owner managers there is the possibility “that they are less
interested in training and development” (McKeown et al., 2005, pg149). As far back as 1994,
with specific relation to marketing, strategic and operations management it was emphasised
that skills and capabilities of many managers in the printing industry were deficient (McIver
Associates, 1994). This was mainly due to the owners production background that creates an
emphasis on technical rather than management competencies (McKeown et al., 2005).
Causes of Overcapacity:
Over investment: It is well recognised that many of the firms in this sector have made huge

investments in technology and machinery for production purposes, of which the strategic
implications of some investment decisions had not been considered (McKeown et al., 2005).
A worrying warning in 2005 relating to investments and their long-term implications, was
that the increase in capital investment had resulted in increased borrowings. In addition it was
discovered that the average machine utilisation was only 74% in 2005 (McKeown et al.,
2005).
Overcapacity – Computer manuals: The computer manual sector came about in the 1980’s
when Ireland was chosen to service the European software market by a number of large U.S.
software companies. The problem arose when the chunky computer manuals that used to go
with every software package were replaced by the CD-Rom. This pushed a lot of capacity
previously used to print the manuals back into the commercial market. Although this issue is
not recent, the industry’s lack of response (despite warnings) contributed to the current
situation.
Overcapacity – Substitutes: Following the development of CD-ROM, the digitisation of
information and the widespread diffusion of the internet, broadband in particular, have all
increased the alternative options to printed material available to consumers and businesses.
More recent threats can be seen in the form of e-book readers and hand held devices which
are now very popular substitutes for books and documents. Amazon recently announced that
their e-book sales eclipsed paperbacks in 2011 (www.guardian.co.uk, 2011).
Overcapacity - Government contracts and Foreign competition: Recently a major
concern of industry has been the outsourcing of government printed material to other EU
Countries. The concern was that the Irish government were placing more print contracts up
for tender outside the state than other EU countries. At the same time competition from
abroad has increased, due to the higher costs of doing business in Ireland.
Overcapacity - Impact of technology: As with all manufacturing industries, improvements
in technology and machinery have added capacity (McKeown et al., 2005).
Overcapacity - Economic downturn: There were numerous warnings that a recession in any
of a number of sectors would have serious implications for the Irish printing industry
(McKeown et al., 2005). In recession, typically the first budget cut is marketing or
advertising. That is why demand for print and paper products is generally linked closely to
GDP (McIver Associates, 1994). As Ireland is currently facing its worst ever recession
(Collins and O'Halloran, 2010), there are going to be consequences.
Commodity nature of product: Print is a commodity, it puts ink on paper, and the lack of
differentiation combined with overcapacity leaves the industry in question competing solely
on price (McKeown et al., 2005). Failure to differentiate is in line with previous observed
implications of an owner manager production based management lacking a more strategic
approach.
Poor Succession Planning: Because of the owner manager nature of the sector this issue is
critical to the success of the firm, however, there is little evidence of any succession planning
in this industry (McKeown et al., 2005).
Print Management companies: These have been called the catalysts of the downward price
spiral in the industry (Printer, 2009). They come between the customer and the printer, and
offer to make savings to the client. Although not the sole catalyst, they do reduce the margin

companies would have normally absorbed themselves, as such they are contributing to the
downward price spiral referred to above. This is relevant in terms of exit barriers, as any
erosion in profitability only further raises economic exit barriers.
All of the above factors have contributed to the industry's overcapacity and created the
current intensely high level of rivalry with some companies reputed to be quoting prices that
are below their costs.

CASE STUDY:
The topic of capacity rationalisation is extremely relevant in the present climate. Further
investigation recognised that the majority of previous research in this area was clustered
around economic downturns, for example Bower (1986), which was based around a recession
caused by a man-made oil shortage. Indeed research by Wood (2009) utilised a data set taken
from after the collapse of the clay brick industry in the UK during the 1980’s recession. The
current economic downturn gives us a timely opportunity to re-examine this issue. Coupled
with the researchers’ unique level of access to industry experts, a detailed investigation of the
Irish printing industry was possible. A case study methodology was utilised, utilising in-depth
interviews with industry experts in order to understand the current industry, and in doing so
answer the research question: Why would a mature fragmented industry not rationalise
through acquisitions in line with arguments by Bower (1986) and Wood (2009)?
Supplementary objectives identified are as follows:
1.
2.
3.
4.

How do industry experts envisage capacity rationalising?
Identify what has created current overcapacity in the industry.
What do they believe are the impediments to capacity rationalisation in the industry?
What are the possible solutions for capacity rationalisation in the industry?

Six in-depth interviews were conducted, with ex- or current managing directors on the basis
that these are the best source of understanding and insight into industry. Note that names have
been changed to protect anonymity. The following themes were explored: reasons for excess
capacity, impediments to rationalisation, and predictions and solutions for rationalisation.
The data was then analysed and triangulated using a template analysis approach, created and
coined by King (2004), which is a procedure to analyse qualitative data (Saunders et al.,
2009). It refers to a particular way of thematically analysing qualitative data, usually
interview transcripts. A coding ‘template’ is developed, which summarises themes identified
by the researcher(s) as important in a data set and organises them in a meaningful and useful
manner. Hierarchical coding is emphasised, that is to say, broad themes encompass
successively narrower, more specific ones (Huddersfield, 2010).

RESEARCH FINDINGS:
Each sub-objective will first be discussed, before moving to analyse the overall research
objective.
Objective 1: How do industry experts envisage capacity rationalising?

The first sub-objective is that the industry will not proactively rationalise through mergers or
acquisitions. Enthusiastic attitudes towards what could happen were observed, however there
were no industry experts in support of the concept that capacity would proactively exit
through mergers or acquisitions.
•
•

“I think the time for M&A’s, that opportunity is gone” (Karl)
“I don’t see acquisitions playing a major role” (Damien)

As per above the assumption was unanimously supported. Following on from this in response
to how the experts actually see capacity rationalising.
•
•
•

“I think what is more likely to happen than that deal (M&A’s) --- is many many
companies going to the wall and finally the market just making it right” (John).
“So I think that more likely the market will take its toll rather than the industry doing
what it can” (John)
“But I would say that the reality is that the market forces will cause the
rationalisation through closure” (Neil).

The experts ultimately envisage that market forces will force closures. It can be concluded
that the Irish printing industry will not rationalise through any proactive means. Capacity will
be removed through natural closures.

Objective 2: Identify what has created current overcapacity in the industry
As confirmed by industry experts believe that there is still overcapacity in the Irish printing
industry. This confirmation is no great revelation; it is in line with predicted traits of
industries in the mature stage of their life cycle (Porter, 1980). Based on data from the
industry, it is also not surprising considering there was already overcapacity in the Irish
printing industry in 2005 (McKeown et al., 2005). Another indicator pointing to the
possibility of overcapacity was the observation of a high number of articles on investment by
certain companies since 2005, combined with the drop in demand as a result of the world’s
worst recession since the 1930’s (Foley, 2010). A number of issues were identified as adding
to the current level of overcapacity, some of which have long been issues in the industry and
were identified in the literature:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Overinvestment
Work leaving the country
Substitutes
Improvements in technology
Recession
Lack of proactive rationalisation to take capacity out

1) Overinvestment:
According to the experts, overinvestment played the biggest role in the creation of the current
situation of excess capacity, which as per secondary data most notably on overbuilding is a
constant danger in a commodity type industry. Based on an understanding gained from
industry experts the overinvestment in this situation came about because of three elements:

A. Reasons for investing
B. Internal failings
C. External failings
A) Reasons for investing:
There are multiple grounds for investing in new machinery. Here it has been fragmented into
three elements to better articulate why firms in the Irish printing industry did so over the last
several years. They are ‘Defensive’, ‘Ego/ Pride’ and the ‘undisciplined pursuit of more’.
Defensive: Defensive grounds include the firm belief that up to date equipment / machinery
was critical for survival:
“In some cases there was a fundamental belief that to survive if you did not have the
equipment you wouldn't survive” (Karl).
The investments were “actually defensive rather than trying to take over the world, they were
trying to stop shrinkage” (John).
It is an extremely competitive industry where sometimes investments need to be made in the
face of intense competition. This is especially true when competitors whether for the wrong
or right reasons, have upgraded.
“People can be forgiven, I think, for thinking that it is a good time to borrow, interest rates
are low, get a good piece of kit, make life easier and more efficient and so forth. With no one
taking any sectoral kind of view of what’s happening” (Damien).
With no sectoral view, the problem then arose when “a whole load of ten colour B1's and
B2's came into this country” (John).
This lack of a sectoral view connects with previous arguments, which are directly linked into
lack of training, particularly strategic. It is also due to the divided, confrontational and
fragmented nature of the industry, which makes it less likely as a sector to make strategic
decisions.
Ego/ Pride: Although there is the argument that in some cases purchases were defensive, it is
also true to say that others were not. One industry expert sarcastically commented, “Ego and
vanity in the printing industry?” (Neil). In line with secondary literature there is a particular
risk where production has been the traditional concern of management (Porter, 1980).
Undisciplined pursuit of more: In a similar vein, the ‘undisciplined pursuit of more’ as
described earlier is also relevant. Some people did go too far with investment, one
interviewee commenting on the amount of machinery one company had, where he
“couldn’t walk more than five feet without hitting a machine. I have never seen more
equipment, I have never even seen more equipment in a print exhibition” (John).

B) Internal Failings:

The reasons have been identified, but what internal failings allowed the investment to go
through? One in particular highlighted in the last two industry reports is the industry’s
attitude toward training. In fact
“as an industry we have failed to invest in training because management have seen training
as a cost to the company rather than an investment for the future” (Karl)
This lack of training in particular contributes to overinvestment through enabling poor
decision-making and lack of strategic planning on a company level with sectoral
implications.
This issue then contributed to further problems such as lacking strategic skills to plan ahead,
poor decision-making processes, and a focus on volume, not profits:
“a good mechanic may not run a good garage, he may be a good mechanic, and I think a lot
of us are just good printers or good sales people, we are not good business people” (Peter)
Owner manager: Around half of companies in the sector are managed by their owners. Karl
reiterates this point with specific reference to lack of understanding of
“capital investment return on capital employed and a business plan to justify the investments
that have been made in our sector”.
Although those in charge “have a lot of common sense and a lot of gut feeling, which in many
cases has served them very well, I think that where that starts to cause a major problem is
when things get tougher, and they don’t have the capability to really analyse what is going
on” (Neil).
These internal failings allowed overinvestment to go ahead. As highlighted these internal
failings are an area that the industry can do something about but unfortunately previous
attempts through various industry body driven reports have not resulted in proactive action
(Karl).

C) External failings:
Easy credit was cited as the main cause of the current Irish economic downturn
(Countrywatch, 2010). Confirming this, ‘easy credit’ was cited by all experts as the prime
enabler of the current excess capacity. Banks and machine manufacturers,
“were throwing money at people so if you wanted to buy a machine there was no problem to
get the machine on a moratorium” (Neil), in fact
“the people most happy over the last ten years were Komori and Heidelberg, who really sold
an awful amount of equipment that this country did not need, and still have” (John)
The end result was “too many ten colours in Ireland” (Claire).
A ten colour being one of the largest production machines in the industry and Komori and
Heidelberg being the machines manufacturers.

Some respondents emphasised the fact that credit was not always ‘easy’, there was a time
when it was a lot harder to source.
"They put us through rings of fire and in the end didn’t sanction what we were looking for. So
we got it from another bank, but you know if those same kind of attitudes had prevailed into
the ten/ fifteen years later, there would not have been as much madness all around”
(Damien)
This is not an isolated incident in that the lending practices and the Irish banks do not have to
be debated here. It is an accepted fact that the due diligence of some lending practices were
questionable (Countrywatch, 2010). This also corroborates with the reasons for overbuilding
highlighted earlier.

2) Work leaving the country:
Foreign Competition is identified by the experts as a factor, there is
“a significant impact of foreign supply relative to Irish demand, which has not been matched
by Irish companies in terms of being successful in terms of exporting” (Neil)
This is as highlighted earlier and is mainly because of the higher costs of doing business in
Ireland (McKeown et al., 2005). Government contracts were also mentioned: Statistically
there are a very significant amount of government printing contracts being exported in
comparison to other countries. A reduction in this figure would go some way to alleviating
pressure on the industry.

3) Substitutes:
Some elements of the sector are being hit by this issue more than others, but there is no
question especially in relation to electronic media,
“the printed image and the printed message is being sent electronically” (Peter)
Bills, invoices, purchase orders, books, marketing items, annual reports and anything that is
printed in theory can be sent electronically. One industry expert (Peter) believes that in six
years time there will be no schoolbooks and noted that one school where he is from stopped
buying schoolbooks two years ago. He also believes that the upcoming generation will have
less time for print media.

4) Improvements in technology:
Claire pointed out that “technology has increased capacity”, this is as per the impact of this
issue in 2005. This is also reflected in the drop in volume of printing due to the direct
marketing approaches being taken. Customers

“don’t have to print a million leaflets to put into a million homes in Dublin. They can go to
Tesco and buy the data from the Tesco club card. They can target women between 35-40 and
come to someone like us and do 10k leaflets digitally and put them into the right homes”
(Claire)

5) Drop in demand (recession)
As highlighted in McIver (1994) print demand is linked closely to GDP and an economic
downturn has a negative impact on demand for print. Some believe that:
“what it has done is accelerated the demise of companies who have a flawed business model
anyway..that the recession is a catalyst for a necessary change within the industry” (Karl)
There is no doubt that in the short term the drop in demand and other elements as a result of
the economic downturn are impacting on rationalisation through adding to overcapacity.

6) No proactive exits
“The lack of ability for people to do mergers that will take capacity out” (Claire) is at the
core of this issue, no proactive exit means that overcapacity will in the end be eliminated by
product market forces (Jensen, 1993).
Overall, then the experts support the view from literature that current excess capacity was
mainly created through overinvestment in machinery combined with a drop in demand for
printed material as a result of the world’s worst recession since the 1930’s (Foley, 2010).
The overinvestment was mainly due to lack of due diligence by financial institutions (as cited
by experts) combined with traits of a fragmented industry structure. These are: poor strategic
forethought and decision-making, which are a result of a production orientated industry with
a relative disinterest in training.
On previous occasions the industry has been warned of possible excess capacity issues,
including the current debacle and did not proactively or strategically act. One expert believed
that as an industry it will continue doing things the same way and ignore objective warnings.

Objective 3: What do they believe are the impediments to capacity rationalisation in the
industry?
This leads into the next section because it is the following impediments/ exit barriers that
keeps excess capacity from proactively rationalising. This objective addresses the research
question, why will the industry not rationalise through mergers or acquisitions? The
impediments and exit barriers that were identified are discussed under three headings:
impediments to buyers, industry and sellers.

Impediments to buyers:

There are various issues here that culminate with one final point that encapsulates the
impediments from a buyer’s perspective in the current climate:

Assets go home at night in their car
If a company was to acquire or takeover, with the latter referring to an aggressive acquisition,
the main issue is that,
“your biggest asset in any company, like ours, goes home in their car in the evening, and if
anyone aggressively took over company (Y). Everyone would make their own decision where
they wanted to go” (Claire)
As such any acquisition would run the risk that even after acquiring or taking over a
particular company that those in control of the work would not just take it with them and
leave. The presence of such an intangible asset adds risk to any such manoeuvre.

Expectations too high
There were numerous references to proactive pursuits of acquisitions being met by sellers
looking for “absolutely ridiculous multiples of profit” (John).
“A guy selling 450k worth of turnover is probably looking to get 150k for that. He wants
450k and that is the problem, completely unrealistic approach to the value of the business”
(Peter)
Why would anyone pay over the odds for a company in such an economic climate and expose
themselves with the risk? Reference to this was seen in the last chapter were many ‘lifestyle
business owners often over-estimate the value of their businesses’ (McKeown et al., 2005,
pg103).

Lack of credit availability (external issue)
This needs no explanation, there is a serious lack of credit availability with the economic
downturn. The resulting impact is that although there are ample opportunities, both in terms
of machinery and possible acquisitions, without access to additional resources it is hard to
take advantage.

Lack of resources
As a direct result of a number of factors, such as reduction of profitability, credit availability,
uncertainty and others “people don't have the resources and or the surplus funds” (Karl) to
carry out acquisitions.

Waiting for the Apple to drop (liquidations)

This is the most important of all the actors from a buyer’s perspective, which results in
abstention from proactive rationalisation. This theme was highlighted in the last fifteen
minutes of the last interview by a very observant industry expert who proposed:
“I don’t see acquisitions playing a major role. Its like, if you want the apple are you going to
overreach trying to get it down from the tree? When you know it might fall in a few hours.
And I think there are apples waiting to fall” (Damien).
This insight is crucial and it articulates what people in a position to acquire others are
thinking. Why would they deal with the ego, high expectations and more when they risk the
sales book leaving anyway especially when they can try to catch elements of the company
when it goes into liquidation?

Impediments to Industry
There are only two components here, and both are as a result of the fragmented industry
structure:
No Industry Leader:
This is a very important point in relation to why the industry will not rationalise through
acquisitions. This is that
“what is missing from this is a really big strong player who could mop up the kind of thing
that you are talking about … who can take out the smaller capacity and take over maybe
struggling companies, to amalgamate them into one big, stronger company, I can't think of
one company that is playing that role here in the print industry, so I think we are probably
leaderless to an extent” (John)
This lack of leadership is down to structure, a fragmented industry being a unique
environment because of the absence of market leaders (Porter, 1980). This leaves the industry
leaderless and unable to cooperate for a common goal, which in this situation would be
capacity rationalisation. As such there is no proactive push from the industry to help itself.

Industry Body:
Some experts labelled the industry bodies as
“toothless in the sense that they are not monitoring. They are only active now because there
is carnage” (Peter)
This body can only advise, it does not have any powers to do more. The prime reason for this
is because of the competition authority,

“the Printing Federation would love to get more active in terms of trying to bring some
facilitators in to the sector to see could you get people together to start thinking and talking
about what they are doing. But you can’t do that” (Neil)

Impediments to Seller
Like demand for print, demand for printing companies and their assets has also been affected.
It also mirrors items from ‘internal failings and reasons’ around the excess capacity section.
This is because the failings in decision-making and planning have repercussions in this
section. In no particular order the following are the elements that make up seller
impediments:

Focus not on profit
In line with literature around fragmented industries is the presence of people who are not
profit driven (Porter, 1980). This is highlighted by one industry expert:
“there is no one at the bottom of the gate saying where is my return?” (John)
As such companies can remain in business even when economically they should leave. This
is also seen where people are keeping uneconomic capacity
“by occupying a machine that should be mothballed by selling it at prices that are below
cost” (Karl)
If they focused more on profit there could be a removal of the unprofitable capacity.
Owner manager attachment
This is probably the main barrier to exit of capacity in relation to sellers. Emotive
“connections to keeping their fathers companies alive. First generation, emotive feelings to
keep what they built alive” (Claire)
This is also probably the most understandable impediment to sellers and ties with owner
manager issues from the literature.
“It is an emotional issue, you start something, you own it, you feel responsible for it” (Peter)
All of these issues are in line with the managerial exit barrier literature and creates a barrier
to exit even though the rational economic decision is to do so. This is a huge impediment in
terms of rationalisation and is also linked to the fact that the industry is all they know.
Residual value too low
This is a straight forward economic/ structural exit barrier as per the literature on exit
barriers. With the drop in prices offered for companies and machinery companies are
economically better off remaining.

“The simplest way for rationalisation is for businesses to close, but if someone is going to
close their business they have to have a way of getting out of it with some sort of financial
stability, basically they cant afford to lose their shirt in the process” (Neil)
Ego/ pride
Ego/ pride can stop capacity rationalising. People should have their “egos extracted at birth”
(Peter). Speaking in relation to acquisition attempts to acquire other companies, Claire
comments that on one possible merger/ acquisition situation:
“ego took over to the point that the deal couldn’t be done” (Claire)
This also ties in with literature around managerial exit barriers.
To conclude discussion of the impediments to capacity rationalisation in the industry, buyer’s
have neither the appetite nor resources to pursue acquisitions. This is especially true in
relation to the high expectations and egos of sellers to contend with. Combined with the fact
that there will, without doubt, be some closures; the prevailing attitude seems to be that rather
than overreaching to acquire the company, buyer’s will wait to see what they can acquire if
and when companies go into liquidation.
From a seller’s perspective the exit barriers to rationalisation both from economic and
managerial perspectives are very high. The economic barriers are due to the low resale value
of assets and companies. Companies are actually better off economically remaining in
business. The managerial barriers are also very prevalent, which are common in fragmented
industries such as emotional attachment to the businesses.
From an industry perspective there are no market leaders or industry bodies with the power to
influence the industry in terms of pricing or rationalisation. This is because of the fragmented
confrontational nature of the industry structure.

Objective 4: What are the possible solutions for capacity rationalisation in the industry?
In the beginning of this process there were high expectations in terms of finding alternative
solutions to excess capacity issues. There are a few options but unless the government come
on board as they did for the fishing industry there is not much chance of any alternative
solutions succeeding. Without outside intervention getting past anti-competition issues which
the current industry bodies are restricted by, the confrontational nature of the fragmented
mature industry will restrict any other options.
The following potential solutions were suggested:
Natural closures, merger and acquisitions, takeovers, liquidation, or 'wait for the apple to
drop', scrappage scheme, diversification, collectively cut capacity, and some other
propositions. The one reference to takeovers (Claire) was referring to takeover’s working
when a company is going through an examinership process, however, these are so few and far
between in terms of companies entering into examinership it is not a real option.

Reference to some sort of scrappage scheme similar to that explained in chapter one was the
most widely iterated alternative option by the experts. This is mainly because
“when you consider the government are going to pay out three million this year alone to the
unemployed in the printing sector” (Karl)
“government could facilitate a process and could say you know like they done in the pig
industry and the fish industry … where they have consciously bought out capacity … and see
what is left or have a very planned targeted campaign to take the capacity out and what is left
is a viable industry” (Neil)
The overall impediments to rationalisation have been clearly shown above, but why are they
even there? What is the root cause that will answer the question: why will the industry not
rationalise through mergers or acquisitions?
There are only really two viable options and in accordance with the experts views they are
highly unlikely to happen. The first one is a government driven scrappage scheme. This has
to be government driven, as the industry body is powerless due to anti competition laws. In
essence the government would buy second-hand machinery off the industry for use in
government printing departments, of which there are many, Including one in Leinster house
(the seat of the Irish Government).
The other option is through strategic partnerships with companies combining together to
pursue larger contracts or utilising common resources. The problem with this is the
confrontational nature of the industry. This is an option but will likely never happen on a
scale large enough to proactively avoid the market-driven closures that will rationalise the
industry.

CONCLUSIONS: WHY WOULD A MATURE FRAGMENTED
INDUSTRY NOT RATIONALISE THROUGH ACQUISITIONS IN LINE
WITH ARGUMENTS BY BOWER (1986) AND WOOD (2009)?
The mature and fragmented Irish printing industry would not rationalise in line with
arguments from above authors because simply put, it is a fragmented mature industry. The
industries looked at in the previous research (Bower, 1986, Wood, 2009) were concentrated
and through the actions of market leaders within them, more specifically proactive
acquisitions, they were able to rationalise capacity in the industry. Unfortunately traits
associated with a fragmented industry structure such as their confrontational, uncooperative
and leaderless nature means that they do not rationalise in the same way. They will not get
past the exit barriers because they will not work together and there is no leader to proactively
drive any initiatives. Bar outside intervention, the only way capacity will rationalise in such
an industry is through firm closure, this resembles a slow bicycle type race with others
hoping their competitors will go out of business before they do and so allow them to survive.
United the concentrated industries stand and divided the fragmented industries fall.
With reference to the maturity of the industry, a lot of fragmented industries are in the mature
stage of their life cycle where there is a more competitive landscape with powerful buyers, a

more commodity type product and some overcapacity. This only adds to the intensity of the
fragmented traits keeping them from proactively dealing with the capacity issue.

RECOMMENDATIONS:
1) The Irish printing industry has a fragmented industry structure of which there are two main
weaknesses in relation to rationalisation. These are its confrontational nature and fact that it is
leaderless. If those within it can, from their own, and the industry’s perspective, come
together and support an external industry body, proactively listen and adhere to their
recommendations it would go along way to strengthen the industry from a number of
perspectives. These would include ability to rationalise now and possibly future prevention of
the need to rationalise.
2) In specific relation to the Irish printing industry. Training by its very nature is there for the
purpose of adding to a person’s competencies. There tends in fragmented industries to be a
more owner manager type set of competencies, without which, that initial, typically
entrepreneurial skill set there would be no company. However, there is a real need to widen
and update their skill base to include strategic tools that can be used for the benefit of
themselves and possibly the industry’s. This is because, although doing what has worked in
the past is not a mistake in itself, ‘if the only tool you have is a hammer, you will hit
everything like it is a nail’, and sometimes a hammer might not be fit for purpose. More
importantly the training recommended does not have to be structured, it can be unstructured
in nature. It is a change in attitude to learning and adopting new ways of thinking more than
anything.
3) Owner manager type companies in the Irish printing industry need to change their attitude
towards profit. Their lack of focus on profit is to the detriment of the industry as a whole. If
they feel the product that they produce has value, then they should ensure they get a
reasonable profit for producing such work. This would go some way to alleviate competitive
rivalry.
4) In the mature fragmented Irish printing industry, the product is a commodity, in order for
companies and the wider industry itself to avoid competition on price alone, they need to
diversify
and
add
value
to
their
customers
in
other
ways.
In specific relation to the Irish printing industry, the only current viable option for
rationalisation other than closures is the involvement of government, which the industry
needs so support the industry body in pursuing, as any other attempt to influence industry
could be seen as anti-competitive.
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